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Abstract—Given a large number of homogeneous players that
are distributed across three possible states, we consider the
problem in which these players have to control their transition
rates, while minimizing a cost. The optimal transition rates are
based on the players’ knowledge of their current state and of
the distribution of all the other players, and this introduces
mean-field terms in the running and the terminal cost. The
first contribution involves a mean-field game model that brings
together macroscopic and microscopic dynamics. We obtain the
mean-field equilibrium associated with this model, by solving
the corresponding initial-terminal value problem. We perform
an asymptotic analysis to obtain a stationary equilibrium for the
system. The second contribution involves the study of the micro-
scopic dynamics of the system for a finite number of players that
interact in a structured environment modeled by an interaction
topology. The third contribution is the specialization of the model
to describe honeybee swarms, virus propagation, and cascading
failures in interconnected smart-grids. A numerical analysis is
conducted which involves two types of cyber-attacks. We simulate
in which ways failures propagate across the interconnected smart
grids and the impact on the grids frequencies. We reframe our
analysis within the context of Lyapunov’s linearisation method
and stability theory of nonlinear systems and Kuramoto coupled
oscillators model.
Index Terms—Game Theory, Social Networks, Opinion Dy-
namics, Multi-Agent Systems, Network Systems, Cyber-Security,
Virus Propagation.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider a large population of players that choose any
of three possible states, state 1, state 2 and state 3. These
states can be also seen as opinions. We model the problem
as a continuous-time discrete-state mean-field game. Players
transition from one state to another according to transition
rates that are influenced by adversarial disturbances. Thus,
the evolution of the state of a player follows a traditional
Markov chain dynamics with controlled and uncontrolled
transition rates. Players control their transition rates to
minimize a cost functional defined over a finite horizon.
The cost functional is composed by a running cost and a
terminal penalty. The running cost accounts for the actual
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i) the study of the microscopic dynamics of the system for a finite number
of players interacting according to a specific topology, ii) the specialization
of the model to describe honeybee swarms, virus propagation, and cascading
failures in smart-grids, and iii) the numerical analysis of a set of cyber-attacks
in the context of smart grids.
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transition rate from a state to another and an additional
term which is a function of the state. Depending on the
function, our model includes both crowd-seeking and
crowd-averse behaviours. The terminal penalty has the same
structure of the running cost in that it weighs the final
state of the player at the end of the horizon. We further
assume that the cost of transitioning from state 1 to state 2
is sufficiently large to discourage direct transitions from 1
to 2 and vice versa. We assume that players are homogeneous.
Highlights of contributions. The main contribution of this
paper is threefold. First, we build a mean-field model where
the macroscopic and microscopic dynamics are brought
together in a unified framework. Second, we provide mean-
field response strategies for the players and the disturbances.
Third, we study stationary mean-field equilibrium points
and prove that such stationary solutions can be obtained in
the asymptotic limit of nonstationary mean-field equilibrium
points, for which we provide an explicit expression. The
following is a list of additional results with respect to the
conference paper, see [1]: i) we extend our study to the case
of honeybee swarm and virus propagation in the framework
of cyber-security; ii) we model the microscopic dynamics
with a finite number of players, which interact according to
a specific topology. The state of the model is the probability
that any given player can be in each of the three possible
states; iii) we provide a case study for a UK power grid,
where we study two types of cyber-attacks; the underlying
Markov model simulates the propagation of the failure due
to the cyber-attack and the impact on the grid frequency;
this simulation is based on the Kuramoto coupled oscillators
model.
Related literature. The origin of the theory of mean-field
games is in [2], [3], [4] by M. Y. Huang, P. E. Caines and
R. Malhame´ and independently in [5], [6], [7] by J. M.
Lasry and P. L. Lions. In the context of Markov decision
processes, the authors in [8] introduce a concept similar to
the mean-field equilibrium, called oblivious equilibrium. For
a survey on mean-field games we refer the reader to [9].
Robust mean-field games are introduced in [10] and studied
further in [11]. Robustness is also discussed in [12].
Mean-field games apply to a variety of domains, including
economics, engineering, physics and biology; for details we
refer the reader to [4], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17]. Mean-
field games have predecessors in anonymous games and
aggregative games where the notion of mass interaction was
already a main feature. Examples of finite state mean-field
games can be found in [18]. For a linear quadratic structure,
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2the author in [19] provides explicit solutions in terms of
mean-field equilibria. Otherwise, numerical approximations
and discretization methods can be used as one of several
solution schemes proposed in recent times, see [13].
Lately, cyber-security and prevention/protection mechanisms
against virus propagation and cyber-attacks have sparked
increasing interest. In the context of smart grids, cyber-
attacks in the form of of data attacks are studied in [20].
Epidemic models to study failure propagation is proposed
in [21]. One key mechanism to contrast these attacks is to
provide interdependency between critical infrastructures. Such
infrastructure can be physical, logical or cyber, see [22]. The
novelty of this work with respect to the discussed literature is
the development of a mean-field game to accomodate existing
models of bio-inspired collective decision-making and provide
for them an evolutionary game interpretation. We also extend
it to cyber-security in the scenarios where a failure induced by
a cyber-attack propagates in the same ways in which viruses
propagate in a network. Two different virus propagation
models are considered: the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered
(SIR) and the Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) models.
The first model describes the human immunity system in
relation to the diffusion of specific viruses such as measles,
mumps and rubella, while the second model extends to viruses
that can be contracted again after healing such as in patients
affected by x-linked agammaglobulinemia, who are unable
to develop immunities to common diseases and infections.
The impact of cyber-attacks on the grid is measured in terms
of frequency oscillations; the simulation model builds on the
analogy with Kuramoto coupled oscillators, see [23].
This paper is organised as follows. In Section II we define
the mean-field model. In Section III we study equilibrium
points and stability. In Section IV we introduce the honeybee
swarm model. In Section V we study the virus propagation
network scenario. In Section VI we provide numerical analysis
and a case study of a real UK power grid. In Section VII we
provide conclusions and future works.
II. MEAN-FIELD GAME MODEL
In this section, a mean-field model for a decision-making
problem with three possible choices is presented. First, a gen-
eral formulation of the problem is given for the macroscopic
model. Then, the perspective of a reference player is tackled:
the optimal control problem is analysed and finally the mean-
field response for the reference player is presented.
A. Macroscopic model: Kolmogorov equations
We consider a large population of players being in any
of three possible states in a continuous-time dynamic game
framework. These players control their states, according to
some optimality criteria. We further assume that all players
behave in the same way, i.e. they are homogeneous. The game
is symmetric with respect to any permutation of players, i.e.
the decision of each player does not take into account the
individual players but rather the distribution of players in each
state. The controls of players depend on the knowledge of
their own position and of the distribution of the population
among the possible states. We assume that the state of a player
evolves following the Markov chain depicted in Fig. 1, where
βij ∈ R3×3 represents the transition rate from node i to node
j, for any generic pair of nodes i, j ∈ I3, where I3 is the set
of three possible states, state 1, state 2 and state 3. Nodes 1
and 2 are the are two alternative choices a player can commit
to, while node 3 is the uncommitted state.
3
1 2
β31
β13
β32
β23
Fig. 1: Markov chain of the system.
We tackle the problem from the perspective of a single
player, hereafter referred to as the reference player.. We
assume that the only information available to the reference
player is the distribution of the whole population modeled
by the probability vector x(t) = [x1, x2, x3]T ∈ S3, where
S3 is the probability simplex in R3 and t > 0 is the time
index. Players change state according to a continuous time
Markov process with transition rate matrix β(t) ∈ R3×3. Each
column of the matrix β has two components, i.e. βi = ρi+wi,
where the first component ρi ∈ (R+0 )3 is controlled by
the player and the second wi ∈ (R+0 )3 is controlled by an
adversarial disturbance. Each component of the matrix β, i.e.
βij , represents the transition rate from node i to node j, as
previously mentioned. The three possible states are:
• state 1: committed to opinion A;
• state 2: committed to opinion B;
• state 3: uncommitted.
In the mean-field limit when the number of players tends to
infinity, the model is described by the following Kolmogorov
equations:
x˙1 = x3β31 − x1β13,
x˙2 = x3β32 − x2β23,
x˙3 = x1β13 + x2β23 − x3β31 − x3β32.
(1)
This model has an initial condition for the distribution x(0) =
x0. From the conservation of mass, we know that x˙3 = 1 −
x1 − x2, thus equation (1) can be rewritten as:
x˙1 = (1− x1 − x2)β31 − x1β13,
x˙2 = (1− x1 − x2)β32 − x2β23. (2)
Then the macroscopic model is represented by the above set
of nonlinear ODEs in the bi-dimensional state space x1-x2.
B. Microscopic model: mean-field response
Let us consider the reference player and model their mi-
croscopic dynamics under the assumption that the distribution
over the time horizon is given. The state of the player indicates
which opinion it is committed to, or if it is uncommitted, and
thus the state takes value in a finite discrete set with cardinality
3. Let the state of the player be denoted by i ∈ I3. The
evolution of the state is described using a continuous-time
3Markov chain. The transition rates are chosen to minimise
a total cost consisting of a running cost and a terminal
cost. The running cost depends on the state of the player,
the distribution of the population and the transition rate, i.e.
g(i, xi, ρi, t) : I3 × S3 × (R+0 )3 × R+0 → R is defined as:
g(i, xi, ρi, t) =
1
2
‖ρi‖2Ri + fi(xi(t)), (3)
where ρi ∈ (R+0 )3 is the transition rate for the reference
player, ‖ρi‖2Ri is the second norm weighted on matrix Ri
and Ri ∈ R3×3 is a 3 × 3 diagonal matrix, defined as
Ri = diag([Ri1, Ri2, Ri3]), where we denote by diag(a) a
diagonal matrix with diagonal a for any generic vector a. We
have chosen g such that:
• it is Lipschitz continuous in xi, with the Lipschitz con-
stant with respect to xi bounded independently of ρi,
• and it is differentiable with respect to ρi, and the deriva-
tive with respect to ρi is Lipschitz continuous with respect
to xi, ∀i ∈ I3.
It can be verified that g(i, xi, ρi, t) does not depend on ρi, is
uniformly convex and is superlinear on ρj , j 6= i.
Let us consider a finite horizon formulation of the game and
use [0, T ] to indicate the horizon window. Thus, the reference
player also incurs in a terminal cost depending on the objective
they seek to minimize. Let the terminal cost be ψ(i, xi) :
I3 × S3 → R, defined as:
ψ(i, xi) = fi(xi(T )). (4)
Then, each player minimises the cost functional
J ixi(ρi, wi, t)
= Eρi,wiit=i
[ ∫ T
t
[
g(iτ , xiτ (τ), ρiτ (τ))− 12‖wiτ ‖2Γiτ
]
dτ
+ψ(iT , xiT )
]
,
(5)
where iτ is the continuous-time Markov chain and describes
the state of the reference player at time τ , the term ‖wi‖2Γi
indicates the second norm weighted by matrix Γi of vector
wi, Γi ∈ R3×3 is a 3 × 3 diagonal matrix defined as
Γi = diag([Γi1,Γi2,Γi3]), and Eρi,wiit=i is the expectation for
the event it = i. The term in wi ∈ (R+0 )3 represents a penalty
on the energy of the disturbance signal. The functional has
the structure of a robust mean-field game in spirit with
H∞-optimal control, see [10]. Roughly speaking, increasing
entries for Γi leads to smaller disturbances in the second norm.
Problem 1: Let x(t) : [0, T ] → S3 be given. Find the
optimal control of the reference player which minimises the
cost functional:
vi(xi, t) = inf
ρi(·)
sup
wi(·)
J ixi(ρi, wi, t), (6)
where vi(xi, t) is the value (later on sporadically denoted also
vi(t)), and the minimization is performed over the Markovian
controls for the reference player control problem, i.e. βiτ (τ) =
ρiτ (τ)+wiτ (τ); here ρi(·) and wi(·) are measurable functions
from R+0 to (R
+
0 )
3 which returns a transition rate and a penalty
of the disturbance, respectively, at every time t.
The Markov chain for the single player is defined as
P[iτ+h = j|iτ ] = [ρj(τ) + wj(τ)]h+ o(h). (7)
We define the generalised Legendre transform of the cost
function g(i, xi, ρi) as
h(xi,∆iz, i) = min
ρi(·)
g(i, xi, ρi) + ρ
T
i ·∆iz, (8)
where ∆i : R3 → R3 is the difference operator on i given by
∆iv = (v
1 − vi, v2 − vi, v3 − vi)T . (9)
When v is the value function, we have that the Hamiltonian
function H(·) is given by:
H(xi,∆iv, i) = inf
ρi(·)
sup
wi(·)
g(·)− 1
2
‖wi‖2Γi + (ρi + wi)T∆iv.
(10)
Because of the superlinearity and uniform convexity of the
cost function g, the function
ρ∗i (xi,∆iv, i) = argmin
ρi(·)
sup
wi(·)
g(·)−1
2
‖wi‖2Γi+(ρi+wi)T∆iv,
(11)
is well defined except for its ith coordinate, which we denote
by ρii and for which we assume:
ρ∗ii(x,∆iv, i) = −
∑
j 6=i
ρ∗Tij (xj ,∆jv, j). (12)
We can now introduce the Hamilton-Jacobi ODEs as follows{ −v˙i = H(xi,∆iv, t),
vi(T ) = ψ(i, xi).
(13)
A system of coupled ODEs with a terminal condition like the
one in (13) is referred to as terminal value problem. The next
result establishes that the solution of (13) is the value function,
in accordance with [18].
Theorem 1: Assume x(t) : [0, T ] → S3 is given over the
horizon. Assume that v : I3 × [0, T ]→ R is a solution of the
terminal value problem in (13). Then v is the value function
associated to the distribution x, and the optimal Markovian
control is β∗i = ρ
∗
i + w
∗
i :
ρ∗i = −R−1i
[
∆iv
]−
= −
[
R−1i1 (v1 − vi)−
R−1i2 (v2 − vi)−
R−1i3 (v3 − vi)−
]
, (14)
w∗i = Γ
−1
i
[
∆iv
]+
=
[
Γ−1i1 (v1 − vi)+
Γ−1i2 (v2 − vi)+
Γ−1i3 (v3 − vi)+
]
. (15)
III. STATIONARY MEAN-FIELD EQUILIBRIUM
A. Mean-field Game
When background players use strategy ρ and the best re-
sponse for the reference player is also ρ, we say that the current
solution is a mean-field Nash equilibrium. The corresponding
4mean-field Nash equilibrium is given by the following system
combining Kolmogorov and Hamilton-Jacobi equations:
x˙i(t) = (1− x1 − x2)β3i − xiβi3,∀i ∈ I3
−v˙i(t) = H(xi,∆iv, t),∀i ∈ I3
x(0) = x0,
viT (T ) = ψ(iT , xiT ).
(16)
The above system is obtained from bringing together (2) and
(11). Equation (11) models the way in which individual players
respond to a population behaviour described by (2), and (2)
describes the way in which the population evolves as a whole
under the assumption that all the players act according to
(11). The macroscopic dynamics are modelled by (2), while
the microscopic dynamics by (11). This problem is called
initial-terminal value problem (ITVP) for the mean-field game.
Expanding the Hamiltonian according to (10) and using the
optimal control and disturbance from (14)-(15), the calculation
of the value function is the following:
−v˙i = 12‖ρ∗i ‖2Ri − 12‖w∗i ‖2Γi + (ρ∗i + w∗i )T∆iv + fi(xi)
= − 12
[
R−1ij [(vj − vi)−]2 +R−1ik [(vk − vi)−]2
]
+
+ 12
[
Γ−1ij [(vj − vi)−]2 + Γ−1ik [(vk − vi)−]2
]
+ fi(xi)
= − 12 (∆iv)−
T
R−1i (∆iv)
− + 12 (∆iv)
+T Γ−1i (∆iv)
+
+fi(xi).
(17)
Assume that v1, v2 < v3 and R12, R21,Γ12,Γ21 > 0 suffi-
ciently large, meaning that the cost to transition from 1 to 2
and vice versa is large. The specialised value function for each
i is:
−v˙1 = 12Γ−113 (v3 − v1)2 + f1(x1),
−v˙2 = 12Γ−123 (v3 − v2)2 + f2(x2),
−v˙3 = − 12 [R−131 (v1 − v3)2 +R−132 (v2 − v3)2] + f3(x3).
(18)
By subtracting the third equation from the first and from
the second in the above system we get:
v˙1 − v˙3 = − 12
[
Γ−113 (v3 − v1)2 +R−131 (v1 − v3)2
+R−132 (v2 − v3)2
]
+ f3(x3)− f1(x1),
v˙2 − v˙3 = − 12
[
Γ−123 (v3 − v2)2 +R−131 (v1 − v3)2
+R−132 (v2 − v3)2
]
+ f3(x3)− f2(x2).
(19)
Let us now denote by y1 = v1− v3 and y2 = v2− v3. System
(19) can then be rewritten as{
y˙1 = − 12a11y21 − 12a12y22 + c1,
y˙2 = − 12a21y21 − 12a22y22 + c2,
(20)
where a11 = Γ−113 + R
−1
31 , a12 = R
−1
32 , a21 = R
−1
31 , a22 =
Γ−123 +R
−1
32 , c1 = f3(x3)− f1(x1) and c2 = f3(x3)− f2(x2).
System (20) is used later on in Theorem 2 to establish
existence of a stationary mean-field equilibrium.
B. Stationary solutions
We are now interested in stationary solutions, also called
stationary mean-field equilibrium points. These are defined as{ ∑
k xkβ
∗
ki −
∑
j xiβ
∗
ij = 0,∀i ∈ I3,
H(x,∆iv, t) = κ, (21)
where κ is a constant. Note that, in a stationary mean-field
equilibrium, function ci are fixed and constant as x is at an
equilibrium of (2) and therefore it is constant. As regards
solutions of the first of (21), namely stationary distributions
x(t), we have studied existence and stability in [1]. In the
rest of this section we focus on the solution of the second of
(21). We are ready to establish existence of stationary value
functions, namely value functions that satisfy the second of
(21).
Theorem 2: Let a stationary distribution be given t 7→
x(t) := xˆ ∈ S3. Then a stationary value function exists and
is given by the mean-field game described by equations (20)
for the stationary problem (21):
y∗1 = −
√
ξ = −
√
Γ−123 Γ13y
∗2
2 − 2Γ13(f2(x2)− f1(x1)).
(22)
y1
y 2
Equilibrium
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
Fig. 2: Representation of the system of equations (20).
We seek the equilibrium points at the intersections of two
ellipses. Among the four points, we are interested in the one
in the third quadrant. When Γ−113 increases, the blue ellipse
becomes thinner vertically, and similarly, when Γ−123 increases,
the red one becomes thinner horizontally. So, this happens
when the inverse of both, i.e. Γ13 and Γ23 respectively,
decreases. When the cost of the disturbance is lower, the equi-
librium point shifts towards the axes, y2 and y1 respectively. If
we view the difference of value functions between two nodes
as a potential difference, the potential difference is constant,
i.e. the potential at the nodes is the same. It is easier for the
disturbance to make the player go back to the node where
their gain is lower. Further, c1 and c2 affect the distance of
the ellipses from the center of axis, the equivalent of the radius
in the circle. This is depicted in Fig. 2.
C. Convergence to stationary solution
In this section we study the link between the stationary
and non stationary solutions. The next result, shows that the
stationary solution is obtained from the nonstationary one
in the limit. Given that the monotonicity and contractivity
5assumptions hold in our case then we are in the presence of
a contractive mean-field game, see [18]. We can also say that
the solution is unique (up to the addition of a constant to v).
Theorem 3: Given T > 0, a vector x0 and a terminal
condition ψ, let (xT , vT ) be the solution of (16) with initial-
terminal conditions xT (−T ) = x0 and vTi (T ) = ψ(i, xTi (T )).
When T →∞
xT (0)→ x¯ ‖vT (0)− v¯‖# → 0, (23)
where (x¯, v¯) is a solution of the stationary problem (21), and
‖v‖# = infλ∈R ‖v +λ1‖. The mean-field game is contractive,
i.e. the stationary solution (21) can be obtained when we study
the asymptotic behaviour of the non-stationary solution of
(16).
IV. HONEYBEE SWARM
In this section, we link the more general model (1) to
the collective decision-making model of honeybee swarm, as
in [24], by showing that the latter can be a specific case
of (1), when the parameters are appropriately chosen. We
consider a population of honeybees and two options where
to build a nest. Each option has a value. Scouting bees
committed to one of the two options try to recruit the other
bees, by using the so-called “waggle dance”. To attract the
uncommitted bees of the swarm, a cross-inhibitory signal is
used by scouting bees committed to one option to disrupt the
waggle dance of the bees committed to the other option. Bees
in the uncommitted state can choose spontaneously to move
to one of the two options. On the other hand, bees committed
to one of the two options can spontaneously transition to
the uncommitted state. We model the two options as two
states, i.e. 1 and 2. The phenomena of the waggle dance and
cross-inhibitory signals can be captured by using parameters
r := r1, r2 and σ := σ1, σ2, respectively. Moreover, we
model the spontaneous commitment by transition rates γ1, γ2
and the spontaneous act of transitioning to the uncommitted
state by the transition rates α := α1, α2. The Markov chain
corresponding to the above model is depicted in Fig. 3.
3
1 2
γ1 + r1x1
α+ σx2
γ2 + r2x2
α+ σx1
Fig. 3: Markov chain corresponding to the evolutionary model
in [24].
Let us assume that the equilibrium point calculated in (22)
involves the transition rates from the uncommitted state to
state 1 and state 2. Then we have:
y∗ =
[
y∗1
y∗2
]
=
[
v1 − v3
v2 − v3
]
=
[ −γ1 − rx1
−γ2 − rx2
]
. (24)
The above means that the difference in the value functions
between the uncommitted state and state 1 and 2 coincides
with the transition rates from 3 to 1 and 2, respectively.
Furthermore, when R31, R32 = 1, from (14), we have
ρ∗3 = −
 v1 − v3v2 − v3
0
 =
 γ1 + rx1γ2 + rx2
0
 . (25)
Likewise, from (15), we get:
w∗1 =
 00
Γ−113 (v3 − v1)+
 :=
 00
α+σx2
γ1+rx1
(γ1 + rx1)
 =
=
 00
α+ σx2
 ,
(26)
where the second equality is obtained by setting
Γ13 = (γ1 + rx1)/(α+ σx2). (27)
Thus, the mean-field game model introduced in Section II
yields the evolutionary model for the collective decision-
making problem of the honeybee swarms, also studied in [25],
which we rewrite as
x˙1 = x3(x1ρ1 + γ1)− x1(x2σ2 + α1),
x˙2 = x3(x2ρ2 + γ2)− x2(x1σ1 + α2),
x˙3 = x1(x2σ2 + α1) + x2(x1σ1 + α2)
−x3(x1ρ1 + γ1)− x3(x2ρ2 + γ2).
(28)
The above analogy also shows that the cross-inhibitory signal
takes the form of a disturbance w in the robust mean-
field game introduced in Section II. The analogy with the
evolutionary model in [26] is exemplified by the Markov chain
depicted in Fig. 3.
In the next subsection, we derive a network model with a finite
number of players that approximate system (1), of which the
mean-field game model in (28) can be seen the asymptotic
approximation when the number of players goes to infinity.
A. Network Honeybee Swarm Model
Let us consider system (28), in the case where we have
a finite number of players and let us now introduce the
microscopic dynamics in the form of a network honeybee
swarm model.
More specifically, the network model involves a population
of N players which correspond to the nodes of the network.
An edge between two nodes indicates that the corresponding
players interact with each others. The interaction network
is described by a fully connected undirected graph G with
adjacency matrix A. The weights on each edge define the fre-
quency of contact. In the following, let us denote ri, si and zi
the probability that player i is in state 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
The transitions rates to a committed and uncommitted state
are modelled by parameter βij , and represent the transition
rates from state i to state j as presented in Section II.
The model describing the time evolution of the infection
6probability for each node is given by the following system
of equations:
s˙i(t) = −β′23si(t)
∑N
j=1 aijrj(t) + β
′
32zi(t)
∑N
j=1 aijsj(t)
−β′′23si(t) + β′′32zi(t),
z˙i(t) = β
′
23si(t)
∑N
j=1 aijrj(t)− β′32zi(t)
∑N
j=1 aijsj(t)
+β′13ri(t)
∑N
j=1 aijsj(t)− β′31zi(t)
∑N
j=1 aijrj(t)
+β′′23si(t)− β′′32zi(t) + β′′13ri(t)− β′′31zi(t),
r˙i(t) = −β′13ri(t)
∑N
j=1 aijsj(t) + β
′
31zi(t)
∑N
j=1 aijrj(t)
−β′′13ri(t) + β′′31zi(t).
(29)
In the equation for s˙i, the first term accounts for the cross-
inhibitory signal, the second term describes the waggle dance
and the last two terms accounts for the spontaneous abandon
of the commitment and the spontaneous commitment itself,
respectively. Similar comments apply to the equation for r˙i
and z˙i. We can rewrite system (29) in vector form as
s˙(t) = −β′23diag(s(t))Ar(t) + β′32diag(z(t))As(t)
−β′′23s(t) + β′′32z(t),
z˙i(t) = +β
′
23diag(s(t))Ar(t)− β′32diag(z(t))As(t)
+β′13diag(r(t))As(t)− β′31diag(z(t))Ar(t)
+β′′23s(t)− β′′32z(t) + β′′13r(t)− β′′31z(t),
r˙(t) = −β′13diag(r(t))As(t) + β′31diag(z(t))Ar(t)
−β′′13r(t) + β′′31z(t).
(30)
We can now present some results on the impact of the
interaction topology to the collective decision-making process.
Theorem 4: Let us consider the network honeybee swarm
model (30), given β′ij , β
′′
ij > 0 for all i, j, over a strongly
connected graph with adjacency matrix A. The following
statements hold:
1) If s(0), r(0) ∈ [0, 1]n, then s(t), r(t) ∈ [0, 1]n for all
t > 0, where [0, 1]n is the n−dimensional space [0, 1].
2) The set of equilibrium points is the set of pairs (1¯n, 0¯n),
(0¯n, 1¯n). The equilibrium points are asymptotically sta-
ble.
3) Let β′23 = kβ
′
32 and β
′′
23 = kβ
′′
32, where k is a param-
eter that corresponds to a measure of the connectivity.
The set of equilibrium points includes the set of pairs
((1/(2 + k))n, (1/(2 + k))n). These equilibrium points
are asymptotically stable.
The novelty of the above result is that a higher connectivity
determines higher values of z at the equilibrium. Thus, the
higher the connectivity, the larger the probability of a generic
agent to be in the uncommitted state.
V. VIRUS PROPAGATION
Here we introduce the virus propagation model under a
network topology, which can be obtained from the model
presented in Section II by assuming that the cross-inhibitory
signal is negligible, i.e. all β′ij coefficients are zero. The virus
propagation models we refer to are the SIS and the SIR models,
and their variants, see [23]. In the SIS model, the individuals
can either be susceptible, or infected. The two states are
denoted by s and z, respectively. After being infected by the
virus, n infected individuals can return to the susceptible state.
The SIR model describes the case where the individuals who
recover from the virus cannot be infected again. Let us assume
that the equilibrium point calculated in (22) is given by:
y∗ =
[
y∗1
y∗2
]
=
[
v1 − v3
v2 − v3
]
=
[ −β31
−β32
]
. (31)
Assuming that R31, R32 = 1, from (14) it can be seen that
ρ∗3 = −
 v1 − v3v2 − v3
0
 =
 β31β32
0
 . (32)
Likewise, from (15), we get:
w∗1 =
 00
Γ−113 (v3 − v1)+
 :=
 00
β13x3
β31
β31
 =
=
 00
β13x3
 .
(33)
In the above we have set
Γ13 =
β13x3
β31
. (34)
The resulting model is as the one in (1). The infection rate can
thus be linked to the matrix Γ which is the cost matrix for the
adversarial disturbance. In the next subsection, we will tackle
the problem of virus propagation in a network and introduce
the microscopic dynamics describing the time evolution of
the probabilities of an individual to be in one of the three
aforementioned states.
A. Network Cyber-Attack Model
Let us review the model of virus propagation in the context
of cyber-security. We model the problem of a hacker trying to
disrupt two holons. A holon is an intelligent entity which is
seen as an autonomous unit component of a multi-component
system. It is autonomous due to the fact that it is able to
process information and make decision on its own. In our
context, a holon is part of a power grid or information system,
which is also autonomous. Variables r, s and z represent
the probability of an individual of being in state 1, 2 and
3, respectively. Parameters β31, β32 models the capability of
the holons to recover from the infection or to mitigate the
cyber-attacks. Here, we model a cyber-attack at two holons,
with the aim of disrupting the services or the data stored. The
final values of s, r determine how far the corruption of data
has propagated through the network. We consider two types
of attacks which can be modelled by different values of βij ,
see [22]:
• sequential attack: the hacker sends continuous burst
attacks, disrupting the customer layer and the information
of control signals. The two holons under attack are
characterized by high values of β13, β23 for short periods
of time;
• continuous low rate attack: usually aimed at disrupt-
ing voltage control at the holons; here small values of
β13, β23 endures for the entire time horizon.
Let (31) hold. Under the assumption that the cross-inhibitory
signal is negligible we henceforth explore the role of the
7connectivity in the equilibrium and stability properties of the
system. Under no cross-inhibitory signal, system (30) reduces
to the following system of ODEs:
s˙i(t) = −β23si(t)
∑N
j=1 aijzj(t) + β32zi(t),
z˙i(t) = β23si(t)
∑N
j=1 aijzj(t) + β13ri(t)
∑N
j=1 aijzj(t)
−β32zi(t)− β31zi(t),
r˙i(t) = −β13ri(t)
∑N
j=1 aijzj(t) + β31zi(t),
(35)
where si, ri are the variables describing the holon. By con-
sidering the conservation of mass, the above system can be
rewritten in vector form as{
s˙(t) = −β23diag(s(t))Az(t) + β32z(t),
r˙(t) = −β13diag(r(t))Az(t) + β31z(t), (36)
where z(t) = 1− s(t)− r(t).
Theorem 5: Let us consider the virus propagation network
model (36), with βij > 0 for all i, j, over a strongly connected
graph with adjacency matrix A. The following statements hold:
1) If s(0), r(0) ∈ [0, 1]n, then s(t), r(t) ∈ [0, 1]n for all
t > 0.
2) The set of equilibrium points is the set of pairs (s∗, 1¯n−
s∗), for any s∗ ∈ [0, 1]n, and the linearization of (36)
about (s∗, 1¯n − s∗) is{
s˙(t) = −β23diag(s∗)Az(t) + β32z(t),
r˙(t) = −β13diag(1¯n − s∗)Az(t) + β31z(t). (37)
For the complete system (35), the set of equilibrium
points is the set of tuples (s∗, 0¯n, 1¯n−s∗). Furthermore,
the above equilibrium points are asymptotically stable if
the following condition holds:
β23diag(s
∗)A1¯n + β13diag(1¯n − s∗)A1¯n
< (β32 + β31)1¯n.
(38)
3) If limβ32,β13→0, then system (35) can be approximated
by the standard SIR model, see [23].
To get a physical understanding of the previous theorem,
consider inequality (38). When the connectivity is higher,
which in turn implies higher values of the entries of the
adjacency matrix, the left-hand side of the inequality increases,
eventually becoming greater than the right-hand side. This
means that the system becomes unstable, since the higher the
connectivity, the higher the probability that a cyber-attack can
infect a holon in the network.
VI. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we carry out two sets of simulations of the
virus propagation scenario. More specifically, in the first set
we study the continuous low-rate attacks while in the second
set we focus on the sequential attacks.
Let us consider the virus propagation model as in (35). For
this set of simulations, we use the network Walpole GSP -
Peterborough (EPN), from the Regional Development Plan in
[27, p 18]. Figures 4-5 show the line diagram and the graph
representation of the network, respectively.
Network. To show the infection probability at each node we
color the nodes in greyscale. In particular, black indicates that
a node has a value of infection greater than 0.75, dark grey
Parameter I II
β13 0.13 {0.13, 0.65}
β23 0.13 {0.13, 0.65}
TABLE I: Varying parameters for the simulations.
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Bus
Fig. 4: Line diagram representation of the Walpole
GSP - Peterborough (EPN), from the Regional De-
velopment Plan in [27, p 18]. Attacker image from
https://thenounproject.com/term/hacker/870666/.
denotes a value of infection in the interval between 0.5 and
0.75, grey indicates a value of infection in the interval between
0.25 and 0.5; finally, white denotes a value of infection below
0.25. The simulation plot of the initial network configuration
is presented in Fig. 6: as it can be seen from the plot, we
assume that node 11 is the infected node which is obtained by
setting his state equal to (0, 1, 0), the initial state of each of
the first five nodes is (0, 0, 1) and for the last five is (1, 0, 0).
For all the following scenarios, β31, β32 are fixed and set to
0.1, to model the curing rates at the nodes. All the parameters
varying across the simulations are shown in Table I. In order
to present the results in a consistent way, each network plot
is supported by a histogram showing the number of nodes in
each of the four categories explained above: no infection for a
value below 0.25 (white), small for a value between 0.25 and
0.5 (grey), moderate for a value between 0.5 and 0.75 (dark
grey) and high for a value above 0.75 (black).
Frequency. We present a set of simulations involving the
frequency analysis of the buses in the network after the attacks.
To study this phenomenon, we model the buses as coupled
oscillators, as in [23]. The frequency of each bus is 50 hertz
(Hz), with possible oscillations in the interval [49.5, 50.5].
Going above or lower these values can compromise the
stability of the network, causing high damage to the provider
and customers. In the original model, the frequency of each
bus θ˙i evolves as in the following ODE:
θ¨i =
ωi
Mi
− KNMi
∑N
j=1 sin(θi − θj)− DiMi θ˙i, (39)
where ωi is the natural frequency, K is a parameter, N is the
number of nodes in the network, Mi and Di are the inertia
and damping coefficients. The quotient K/N is the coupling
strength and it is equal for all the nodes. In our case, we
develop a model to include the adversarial disturbance caused
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Fig. 5: Graph representation of part of the Walpole GSP -
Peterborough (EPN), from the Regional Development Plan in
[27, p 18].
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Fig. 6: Initial configuration of the network: the only infected
node is node 11.
by the cyber-attacks and the fact that we assume that all the
buses have the same natural frequency.
θ¨i =
ω
M − KNM
∑N
j=1 sin(θi − θj)− DM θ˙i + ζi, (40)
where ζi is the added disturbance. For each iteration, the input
of this model is the output of (35) at steady state in terms of the
probability of infection for every node. The attack is modelled
through a disturbance of the type
ζi = ±kˆωˆ, (41)
which can be tuned to model the strength of the attack.
In the simulations, the thick dash-dot blue line denotes the
evolution of the frequency of node 1 and the thick green line
the evolution of node 7, while the other thin dashed lines are
for the other nodes. The two nodes have been chosen because
the former has only one connection, while the latter is the
most connected node in the network.
Continuous low rate attack. As depicted in Fig. 7a, small
values of β13, β23 endure for the whole time horizon, more
specifically we set β13, β23 = 0.1. The infection spreads from
node 11, but the curing rates β31, β32 have values close to
the infection rates, such that the probability of infection at
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(a) Continuous low rate attack: after several iterations (left)
the infection spreads and at the end of the horizon (right) the
infection is relatively contained.
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(b) Histogram showing the infection percentage for the nodes in
the network after several iterations and at the end of the horizon.
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(c) Frequency analysis: the impact of the attack, measured by
the amplitude of the frequency of oscillations, is higher for node
1, characterized by lower connectivity (dash-dot line), than for
node 7, characterized by higher connectivity (thick green line).
Fig. 7: Behaviour of the system when the attacks are of the type
continuous low-rate.
nodes remains low. Note that the nodes with more links are
those that are more likely to be infected. As it can be seen
in the histogram, i.e. Fig. 7b, after several iterations, only 4
nodes, i.e. nodes 4, 5, 7 and 11 from the network plot, have
9a small infection value, while the rest 7 have no infection
at all; however, at the end of the horizon, the infection has
spread and the nodes have either a small or a moderate
infection value. For the frequency analysis, shown in Fig. 7c,
the probability of attack is sampled every 150 iterations. As
it can be seen, even though the probability of infection of
node 7 is almost twice as much as the one of node 1, and
thus it is more likely to have an attack at every sample, the
higher connectivity attenuates the strength of the attack.
Sequential attack. This set of simulations is shown in Fig. 8.
To model sequential burst attacks, we set β13, β23 five times
greater than their normal value every five iterations. Consider
the similarities with the most common denial of service
(DOS) attacks aiming at disrupting the customer layer or the
information of control signals for a service which becomes
unavailable, i.e. a website where the server does not respond.
In this scenario, as depicted in Fig. 8a, at the end of the
time horizon, there are more nodes with higher probability of
infection, the higher the connectivity the larger the infection
values at the nodes. This can also be observed from the values
of the histogram in Fig. 8b. In terms of the frequency, shown
in Fig. 8c, for this type of attack the probability of infection
is sampled every 100 iterations with higher value of kˆ. The
connectivity plays an important role in this case, too: when
node 7 and other nodes are attacked, the first one has lower
peaks, as it can be seen when comparing its peaks to those of
node 1 around iterations 500 and 800.
VII. CONCLUSION
For a continuous-time dynamic game framework, we have
presented a mean-field game model, we have introduced the
initial-terminal value problem and the corresponding station-
ary solution, with the aim of studying the stability. Under
specific assumptions on the transition rates and on the cost
matrices, we have linked the current model to existing models
in the literature such as the bio-inspired model of honeybee
swarm and to the cyber-security model for virus propagation.
By introducing an underlying network, we studied the stability
and provided numerical analysis for a case study of the
network Walpole GSP - Peterborough (EPN). The plan for
future works includes i) the analytical study of the region of
convergence, and ii) the extension of the results to stochastic
dynamics with births and deaths in the population, and iii) the
study of the impact of the connectivity and of the curing rates
in the propagation dynamics.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose that ρi is any control. Suppose
also that w∗i is the optimal disturbance obtained from the
robust hamiltonian in (10), for given ρi. Thus
J ixi(ρi, wi, t)
= Eρi,w
∗
i
it=i
[
ψ(iT , xiT ) +
∫ T
t
iτ (τ))− 12‖w∗iτ ‖2Γiτ
]
dτ
]
= vi(t) + E
ρi,w
∗
i
it=i
[ ∫ T
t
[
dviτ
dt (τ) + (A
ρv)iτ (τ)
+g(iτ , xiτ (τ), ρiτ (τ))− 12‖w∗iτ ‖2Γiτ
]
dτ
]
.
(42)
The second equality above is obtained from the Dynkin
formula
Eρi,w
∗
i
it=i
[
viT (T )− vi(t)
]
= Eρi,w
∗
i
it=i
[ ∫ T
t
[
dviτ
dt (τ)
+(Aβv)iτ (τ)dτ
]
,
(43)
where the terminal condition is viT (T ) = ψ(iT , xiT ) and
(Aρv)iτ (τ) =
∑
j ρij(τ)[vj(τ) − viτ (τ)] is the infinitesimal
generator of process iτ . Then we have that
J ixi(ρi, wi, t) ≥ vi(t) + E
ρi,w
∗
i
it=i
[ ∫ T
t
[
dviτ
dt (τ)
+ minµ(·)∈(R+0 )3
∑
j µj
[
vj(τ)− viτ (τ)
]
+g(iτ , xiτ (τ), ρiτ (τ))− 12‖w∗iτ ‖2Γiτ
]
dτ
]
.
(44)
The above inequality follows from the fact that we minimise
over any control µ(·) ∈ (R+0 )3. From the definition of w∗i ,
which is obtained by maximising over any possible distur-
bance, we can rewrite the RHS in the above as follows
J ixi(ρi, wi, t) ≥ vi(t) + Eρi,wiit=i
[ ∫ T
t
[
dviτ
dt (τ)
+ minµ(·)∈(R+0 )3 maxw(·)∈(R+0 )3
∑
j µj
[
vj(τ)− viτ (τ)
]
+g(iτ , xiτ (τ), ρiτ (τ))− 12‖wiτ ‖2Γiτ
]
dτ
]
.
(45)
Replacing the minimax term by the robust Hamiltonian as in
(10), we obtain:
J ixi(ρi, wi, t) = vi(t) + E
ρi,w
∗
i
it=i
[ ∫ T
t
[
dviτ
dt (τ)
+H(xiτ (τ),∆iτ v(τ), iτ )
]
dτ
]
= vi(t).
(46)
To conclude the proof, the mean-field response as in (13) exists
and it is the value function of the optimal control problem. By
differentiating (10) with respect to ρi and taking the gradient
equal to zero, we have
Riρi + ∆iv = 0, (47)
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from which we obtain the optimal control in (14). Similarly, by
differentiating (10) with respect to wi and taking the gradient
equal to zero, we have:
− Γiwi + ∆iv = 0, (48)
which yields the optimal adversarial disturbance as in (15).
Proof of Theorem 2. First we expand equation (20) as{ − 12 (Γ−113 +R−131 )y21 − 12R−132 y22 + c1 = y˙1,
− 12R−131 y21 − 12 (Γ−123 +R−132 )y22 + c2 = y˙2,
(49)
where c1 = f3(x3)− f1(x1) and c2 = f3(x3)− f2(x2). From
setting y dot 1 and y dot 2 equal we obtain:
− 12 (Γ−113 +R−131 )y21 − 12R−132 y22 + c1 =
= − 12R−131 y21 − 12 (Γ−123 +R−132 )y22 + c2,
(50)
which can be simplified as
− 1
2
Γ−113 y
2
1 + c1 = −
1
2
Γ−123 y
2
2 + c2. (51)
From the last equation, we can now find the equilibrium points
as in (22) when we use the values of c1, c2:
y21 = Γ
−1
23 Γ13y
2
2 − 2Γ13(f2(x2)− f1(x1)). (52)
We are interested in the negative values, which explains why
we consider only the negative value of the square root. This
concludes our proof.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let us study the system around an
equilibrium point for the distribution, which is given and
constant over the horizon, i.e. x(t) = xˆ : [0, T ] → S3. We
consider the following Jacobian for the system (20):
J =
[
(Γ−113 + R
−1
31 )y1 R
−1
32 y2
R−131 y1 (Γ
−1
23 + R
−1
32 )y2
]
. (53)
Let us linearise the system and among the four equilibria
represented by the 4 intersections between the two ellipses,
the only asymptotically stable node is the one in the third
quadrant. This derives from the fact that ∆ > 0 and T 2 > 4∆,
where ∆ is the determinant and T is the trace of the Jacobian
matrix.
The computation for the stability analysis include the calcula-
tion of the trace T and determinant ∆ of the Jacobian matrix
in equation (53) at the equilibrium:
T = (Γ−113 +R
−1
31 )y1 + (Γ
−1
23 +R
−1
32 )y2,
∆ = (Γ−113 +R
−1
31 )(Γ
−1
23 +R
−1
32 )y1y2 −R−131 R−132 y
√
ξ.
(54)
We can easily expand ∆, to see that it is always positive (which
implies that there is no saddle point):
∆ = (Γ−113 Γ
−1
23 + Γ
−1
13 R
−1
23 R
−1
32 +R
−1
31 Γ
−1
23 )y1y2 > 0. (55)
Analogously, we compute the square of the trace and compare
it to the determinant to see if we have an asymptotically stable
or unstable node:
T 2 = (Γ−113 +R
−1
31 )
2y21 + (Γ
−1
23 +R
−1
32 )
2y22+
+2(Γ−113 +R
−1
31 )(Γ
−1
23 +R
−1
32 )
2y1y2.
(56)
From the above equation, it is easy to see that T 2 > 4∆
for the third quadrant, then we have an asymptotically stable
node. This concludes our proof.
Proof of Theorem 4. The proof for each statement follows:
1) The fact that, if s(0), r(0) ∈ [0, 1]n, then
s(t), r(t) ∈ [0, 1]n for all t > 0, means that [0, 1]n
is an invariant set for the differential equation
(30). This can be seen by specializing the right-
hand side of both equations in (30) in 0 and 1
and check whether the derivatives are positive and
negative definite, respectively. To see this, note
that, in 0, we have s˙(t) = −β′23diag(0¯n)Ar(t) +
β′32diag(z(t))A0¯n − β′′230¯n + β′′32z(t) = β′′32z(t), and
r˙(t) = −β′13diag(0¯n)As(t) + β′31diag(z(t))A0¯n −
β′′130¯n + β
′′
31z(t) = β
′′
31z(t), which are positive definite.
Analogously, in 1, we have s˙(t) = −β′23diag(1¯n)A0¯n+
β′32diag(0¯n)A1¯n − β′′231¯n + β′′320¯n = −β′′23, and
r˙(t) = −β′13diag(1¯n)A0¯n + β′31diag(0¯n)A1¯n −
β′′131¯n + β
′′
310¯n = −β′′13, which are negative definite.
Then, for the property of continuity of the equations,
we can conclude that [0, 1]n is an invariant set for the
set of differential equations (30).
2) Let us rewrite system (30) by removing the explicit
dependance on time as:
s˙ = −β′23diag(s)Ar + β′32diag(1¯n − s− r)As
−β′′23s+ β′′32(1¯n − s− r),
r˙ = −β′13diag(r)As+ β′31diag(1¯n − s− r)Ar
−β′′13r + β′′31(1¯n − s− r),
(57)
where we have z = 1¯n − s− r, by taking into account
the conservation of mass. By inspection, it is straight-
forward to prove that the pairs (1¯n, 0¯n) and (0¯n, 1¯n) are
equilibrium points of the above system.
To prove stability, consider system (57). The correspond-
ing Jacobian matrix linearized about (1¯n, 0¯n) is
J =
[
−β′′231¯n − β′′321¯n −β′23A1¯n − β′32A1¯n − β′′321¯n
−β′′311¯n −β′13A1¯n − β′′131¯n − β′′311¯n
]
,
(58)
and the Jacobian matrix linearized about (0¯n, 1¯n) is
J =
[
−β′23A1¯n − β′′231¯n − β′′321¯n −β′′321¯n
−β′13A1¯n − β′31A1¯nβ′′311¯n −β′′131¯n − β′′311¯n
]
.
(59)
For both matrices, the trace is negative. We can ensure
asymptotic stability when the coefficients of the main
diagonal of the Jacobian matrix are, in absolute value,
greater than those in the off-diagonal. Otherwise, we
have saddle points.
3) We now prove that the pair ((1/(2+k))n, (1/(2+k))n)
is a set of equilibrium points. We seek equilibrium points
that are symmetric, i.e. s = r. We can rewrite the first
equation of (57) as
s˙ = −(β′23 + 2β′32)diag(s)As+ β′32As
−β′′23s+ β′′32(1¯n − 2s). (60)
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By linearizing about ((1/(2 + k))n, (1/(2 + k))n), by
inspection, we have
s˙ = −(kβ′32 + 2β′32)diag((1/(2 + k))n)A(1/(2 + k))n
+β′32A(1/(2 + k))n + β
′′
32(1¯n − (2 + k)(1/(2 + k))n),
(61)
where the first two terms and the last one cancel out.
Thus, ((1/(2 + k))n, (1/(2 + k))n) is an equilibrium
point of the system. For system (60), ((1/(2+k))n, 1¯n−
(2/(2 + k))n, (1/(2 + k))n), is the corresponding set of
equilibrium points.
To prove stability, consider system (57). The corre-
sponding Jacobian matrix linearized about ((1/(2 +
k))n, (1/(2 + k))n) is
J =
[
−β′32A1¯n − β′′321¯n −β′32A1¯n − β′′321¯n
−β′31A1¯n − β′′311¯n −β′31A1¯n − β′′311¯n
]
. (62)
The determinant of (62) is ∆(J) = 0, while the trace
is Tr(J) = −β′32A1¯n − β′′321¯n − β′31A1¯n − β′′311¯n. So,
if Tr(J) < 0 the equilibrium point for the system, i.e.
(s∗, 0¯n, 1¯n − s∗), is asymptotically stable. This is true
since all the coefficients of the Jacobian matrix are
negative.
Proof of Theorem 5. Each statement is proved in the follow-
ing:
1) If s(0), r(0) ∈ [0, 1]n, then s(t), r(t) ∈ [0, 1]n for all
t > 0, it means that [0, 1]n is an invariant set for the
differential equation (36). By setting the equations in 0
and 1, it must be checked whether the derivatives are
positive and negative definite, respectively. So, in 0, we
have s˙(t) = −β23diag(0¯n)Az(t) + β32z(t) = β32z(t),
and r˙(t) = −β13diag(0¯n)Az(t) + β31z(t) = β31z(t),
which are positive definite. Similarly, in 1, we
have s˙(t) = −β23diag(1¯n)A0¯n + β320¯n = 0, and
r˙(t) = −β13diag(1¯n)A0¯n + β310¯n = 0, which are
nonpositive definite. Since the equations are continuous,
then we can conclude that [0, 1]n is an invariant set for
the set of differential equations (36).
2) Let us rewrite system (37) by removing the explicit
dependance on time and by taking into account the
conservation of mass as:{
s˙ = −β23diag(s∗)A(1¯n − s− r) + β32(1¯n − s− r),
r˙ = −β13diag(1¯n − s∗)A(1¯n − s− r) + β31(1¯n − s− r).
(63)
The corresponding Jacobian matrix is therefore:
J =
[
ζ ζ
η η
]
, (64)
where ζ = β23diag(s∗)A1¯n − β321¯n and η =
β13diag(1¯n − s∗)A1¯n − β311¯n. The determinant of
(64) is ∆(J) = 0, while the trace is Tr(J) =
β23diag(s
∗)A1¯n − β321¯n + β13diag(1¯n − s∗)A1¯n −
β311¯n. So, if Tr(J) < 0 the equilibrium point for the
system, i.e. (s∗, 0¯n, 1¯n − s∗), is asymptotically stable.
This holds true when the condition (38) holds.
3) When limβ32,β13→0, system (35) can be rewritten in
vector form as s˙(t) = −β23diag(s(t))Az(t),z˙(t) = β23diag(s(t))Az(t)− β31z(t),
r˙(t) = β31z(t),
(65)
which is the equivalent of the standard SIR network
model.
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